2020-2021
Model Arab League

BACKGROUND GUIDE
Joint Defense Council

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Honorable Delegates,

Welcome to the 2020-2021 Model Arab League Joint Defense Council. My name is Fatima Ahmad and I am honored to serve as the chair for the Joint Defense Council. I am currently a student majoring in Chemistry with a concentration in Medicinal Organic Chemistry and a minor in Mathematics at Georgia State University. Coming from an Arab background myself, MAL has been an excellent opportunity to project my passions and hone my diplomacy skills to utilize in my professional future.

This will be my third year engaging with the NCUSAR MAL program and my sixth MAL conference, so I've learned the ins and outs of MAL and prepared tips to help you succeed in competition:

1.   **Understand Your Narrative:** You are no longer an American student with a typically Eurocentric, orientalist perspective of the Arab world. You are now an ambassador of your assigned Arab member state, meaning you should now think like an Arab, debate like an Arab, and provide Arab solutions, no matter how likeable or unlikeable the stance may be. It's important to put aside your personal opinions, biases, or prejudice and focus on the scope of your represented member state.

2.   **Preparation:** If there's one thing a delegate can't hide in his/her/their performance, it's lack of preparation. You can't caucus or negotiate topics you don't fully understand. So, it's exceedingly important that you are well-versed on your topics and have firm, yet flexible solutions in mind. This includes practicing rules of procedure, resolution writing, and public speaking. The months preceding your conference should incorporate rigorous research and practice. I highly recommend you reach out to professionals who specialize in these topics, write a position paper, and hold regular mock conferences with your fellow teammates.

3.   **Separate The Person From The Problem:** Maintaining a professional demeanor is one of the hardest skills to master, yet one of the most important. When debate gets heated, it's easy to allow your feelings to take over, but remember, you are competing to find solutions; so put the League's priorities before yours. However, do not assume that there will not be heated debate. Keep in mind that decisions approved by a two-thirds majority in the JDC are binding to all; thus, heated debate is inevitable. It's about how you handle such intense moments that define you as a diplomat. So, express your perspective in a calm, respectful manner to ensure you don't lose sight of their position or interests.

4.   **Reach Out:** If you need help, reach out. I am here to assist you in any way you need! Please do not hesitate to email me with the subject heading "JDC MAL" at fahmad5@student.gsu.edu with any questions.

I am looking forward to chairing future leaders and am certain you each will bring a set of unique ideas and resolutions to the table!

Best wishes,
Fatima Ahmad

Topic I: Discussing common postures relating to doctrines of foreign military interventions in the region and how to manage such instances through intra-League collaboration.

I.   **Introduction To The Topic**

A. **General Background**

Previous and current accounts of foreign military intervention in the MENA region have acted as one of the greatest contributing factors to how the MENA region functions, or struggles to function, today. More than any other region in the world, the MENA region is defined not simply by trade ties, diplomatic relations, or regional organizations, but often by ruling power and military potency.[1] This has been the case for the region's modern history and will predictably remain so for the foreseeable future. Amid such fragmented regional order, the ongoing civil wars, such as in Syria, Yemen, Libya and more have become apparently unmanageable. Regional power struggles and western imperialism have worked hand-in-hand to ensure these conflicts are prolonged and frenzied.[2]

It is safe to say that non-neutral and non-humanitarian military interventions are problematic, and even when marketed as neutral and humanitarian, typically pose a threat as well. Such intervention alters the probability of justifiably winning off the warring factions, either through direct military assistance or through incentives to raise war-related resources, or both. In addition, this type of intervention typically worsens the intensity of fighting and the number of casualties, as external support decreases the rebels' dependence on local support and alters their incentives to protect the local population. Libya stands as one of our biggest examples, along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Russia, Turkey, and as of recently, Egypt, each involved in the conflict. Although not a single one of these key players entered the conflict with neutral agendas, the UAE specifically exemplifies problematic intervention. The UAE is Haftar's main supporter, dating back to 2011 when they supplied Haftar advanced weapon systems in violation of a UN arms embargo imposed at the beginning of an uprising that toppled longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi.[3] They consider Haftar a trusted partner because they believe Haftar is capable of eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood's regional presence. Now, Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) relies heavily on UAE air support and regional allyship.[4]

Three factors in particular have served to escalate and perpetuate conflicts. First, the regional balance of power has markedly shifted following the Arab Spring and 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Second, local disputes that started out as non-threatening have escalated ludicrously and

[1] "Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East." Stivachtis, Yannis. *E-International Relations,* 2018. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/04/conflict-and-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east/
[2] "Impact of Imperialism on the Region." PRESSBOOKS, epub. 2020. https://ohiostate.pressbooks.pub/key2mideast/chapter/the-impact-of-imperialism-on-the-region/
[3] "ANALYSIS - Why UAE Seeks to Crush Libya's Democratic Transition." AA, 2020, www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-why-uae-seeks-to-crush-libya-s-democratic-transition/1784855.
[4] "Libya's-Militia-Problem." *Human Rights Documents Online*, doi:10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-0128-0134.

transformed into regional rivalries that are playing out in larger, more lethal conflicts[5]. Third, arms imports/sales from the United States and its European allies have soared and given many non-state actors leverage. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states "arms flows to the Middle East have increased by 87 percent over the past five years and now account for more than a third of the global trade," typically ending up in the hands of insurgent groups or dictatorships.[6] These three factors have resulted in military interventions across the region and they are important to keep in mind as you research your member state's stance regarding this topic.

B. History Of The Topic

To truly explore this topic, we must start at the Arab world's greatest recent turning point that hauntingly shaped the Arab world; the Arab Spring. Following independence, nearly all Arab states were at stable socioeconomic standing and making progress to improve access to basic services. Subsequently, when Arab Spring protests set in motion, they were initially peaceful and drew broad-based support due to widespread dissatisfaction, particularly with the erosion in the living standards of the middle class and poverty rates.[7] It was clear the Arab Spring initially brought hope for change in the MENA region, but soon, the term quickly became a misnomer. After multiple protests toppled autocratic governments and adverse political violence escalated, victims of human rights abuses recognized that the transition would be prolonged and difficult. However, even during this troubling period at the forefront of the Arab Spring, all Arab member states except for Yemen, did not fit the profile of member states at risk for civil war. So, where did things go wrong?

Simply answered, the initial protests did not account for multiple foreign military interventions that would completely shift the narrative of the Arab Spring. Regional powers used such vulnerability as an opportunity to increase their influence in the region and Western powers exploited the opportunity to assert their dominance as well.[8] With a swarm of stakeholders from multiple member states intervening in an uncoordinated fashion, destruction was inevitable. Some of these interventions claimed to intend for humanitarian goals, but most did not, and provided military support to different sides in the conflict. Since interventions were almost never neutral and favored different factions, they created conditions for the competitive arming of rebels and financial support for rebel groups, increasing the risk of conflict intensification.[9]

Many member states exemplify how past dangerous interventions have crippled their potential to this day, such as Libya, Iraq, and Yemen, which continue to battle foreign intervention and suffer

[5] "Conflict Escalation in the Middle East Revisited: Thinking through Interstate Rivalries and State-Sponsored Terorrism." Khan, Akbar and Han Zhaoying. *Israel Affairs*, 26(11):1-15, 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338918937_Conflict_escalation_in_the_Middle_East_revisited_thinking_through_interstate_rivalries_and_state-sponsored_terrorism'

[6] "Arms Sales to Middle East Have Increased Dramatically, New Research Shows." *Middle East Eye*, www.middleeasteye.net/news/arms-sales-middle-east-have-increased-dramatically-new-research-shows

[7] "Why Were the 2011 Middle East Uprisings Called the Arab Spring?" ThoughtCo, 2020, www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-the-arab-spring-2353029

[8] "The 'Arab Spring': Five Years On." Amnesty International, 2020, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/arab-spring-five-years-on

[9] "Analysis of the Arab Spring." GSDRC, 28 Apr. 2016, gsdrc.org/publications/analysis-of-the-arab-spring.

inflamed circumstances.[10] Lebanon, also illustrates this issue. In 1970, foreign interventions in Lebanon began to express support for the Shia minority, which was pushed out of southern Lebanon into the urban peripheries of Beirut. These interventions greatly affected religious disparities and dynamics of power, which resulted in a split into a pro-Nasser Sunni Muslim camp and pro-Western Christian camp. Confrontation between the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) erupted and sectarian violence escalated, leading to further interventions in a vicious cycle that grew into a large-scale conflict. This conflict resulted in over 120,000 fatalities.[11]

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C. Finding A Solution To The Problem: Past, Present, and Future

Overcoming obstacles that have led to great instability in the Arab world is a daunting task for regional and international policymakers. Even in the best scenario imaginable, there is no denying that progress toward deescalation and stability is likely to be incremental, slow, and uneven. Nonetheless, there are concrete steps that regional and international actors can explore to mitigate the dangers of these conflict escalators through intra-League collaboration. Reducing the likelihood of further escalation toward regional conflict is your most difficult obstacle, considering member states want to assert their power. When debating this issue, remember that Article 5 of the Arab League Charter limits dispute settlement by the Council to cases which do "not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity" and only where "the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference." It also focuses on "differences which threaten to lead to war between two member-states, or a member-state and a third state," meaning member states cannot exploit civil unrest or uprisings as opportunities to assert their power.[12]

Equally important, many member states do not fully stand for or against military intervention, falling somewhere in the middle. Although excessive polarization is not ideal, this topic's unclear background leaves us lost in a grey area. There are three levels of intervention; strong, weak, and medial. A weak intervention props up an opponent too small to be a real threat. On the opposite side, a very strong intervention on both sides leaves little scope for conflict. It's the in-between, however, that is the problem; when intervention in support of the losing side takes place only when the other side is prevailing but remains under threat. The roles alternate and the conflict does not come to an end, most likely resulting in prolonged conflict with a bloody ending.[13]

The 1955 conflict between South Sudan and North Sudan (current Sudan) is a case in point. The

[10] "For the Middle East, the Arab Spring was a rare chance to control its own fate." Byman, Daniel. Washington Post, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/for-the-middle-east-the-arab-spring-was-a-rare-chance-to-control-its-own-fate/2020/06/25/45d1fe1e-84c9-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html

[11] "Behind Lebanon's Continuing Crisis." Pollock, David. *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/behind-lebanons-continuing-crisis

[12] Charter of the League of Arab States art. 5, 22 March 1945, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125350/8005_arableaguecharter.pdf

[13] "Foreign Policy: The Middle East." The Policy Circle, 22 July 2020, www.thepolicycircle.org/brief/foreign-policy-brief-the-middle-east.

uneven and highly disordered involvement of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda caused the conflict to prolong until July 9th, 2011, when South Sudan seceded from Sudan.[14] More recently, the continuous conflict between Iraq, Iran, and the U.S (not the U.S invasion of Iraq) is a case in point, with Iran intervening in sufficient strength to protect politically-driven, selective areas in Iraq, but not enough to threaten the U.S and fully stand with Iraq, while the U.S continues to exploit Iraqi soil and target Iran-backed leaders in Iraq.[15] Naturally, Iraq suffered immense regional divide and disruption, civil unrest, and a bloody war raged until the intervention supposedly ended.

Worryingly, member states typically fall in the middle. It's your responsibility to follow whichever agenda your country leans towards. Brainstorm ways of establishing mechanisms for information exchange, which can reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and perhaps provide off-ramps to de-escalate crises when they occur. If your country, however, is staunchly against information sharing, develop counterarguments and alternatives. As a committee, you must discuss whether a League-wide approach can be taken to address the future of foreign, extra-regional powers intervening in matters of MENA defense and security. Depending on what extent member states are willing to push against foreign intervention, you should discuss what steps can be taken together to deal with existing and future foreign military interventions.

II. Questions to Consider in your Research

- How could getting the League of Arab States involved during periods of foreing military intervention be positive or negative?

- Has the member state I'm currently representing suffered from military intervention or intervened? If yes, did they succeed? And, how? Do they have plans to do so in the future?

- What can we learn from these past failures?

III. Questions a Resolution Might Answer

- Will the League of Arab States be assessing the current state of conflict themselves? Or will another body be doing so? What steering committees could be assigned to do such research?

- Will states be required to help mitigate conflict?

- Will states be required to recognize all areas of conflict?

- What funding will be used to mitigate conflict?

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[14] "South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self Determination, (Riek Machar)." Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, University of Pennsylvania, 1995, www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html
[15] "War and Peace and Military Intervention." Levine, David and Salvatore Modica. VoxEU, CEPR Policy Portal, 2010, voxeu.org/content/war-and-peace-and-military-intervention

● How will financial contributions be regulated?

● How will the League ensure that all member states participate and contribute equally?

IV. Additional Resources

● [Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950](#) (Arab League treaty that initiated the JDC)

● [Arab Charter on Human Rights](#) (Arab League framework that will provide you with background information and examples of committee language)

● [MENA Region Intersections of Military](#) (Accounts on foreing military intervention)

Topic II: Identifying the primary gaps in Member States that allow state and non-state militias to recruit child soldiers.

IV.   **Introduction To The Topic**

A. **General Background**

Child soldiers are children (individuals under the age of 18) who are used for military purposes. According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and international human rights law, no child under 18 may be recruited into armed forces (government military) or armed rebel groups (militias and gangs).[16] The term "child soldier" encompasses a wide range of roles in which children are used in military conflict.[17] By the turn of the 21st century, child soldiers had served in significant numbers on every continent of the globe except Antarctica. They have become integral parts of both organized military units and nonmilitary, but still violent, political organizations, including rebel and terrorist groups. They serve as combatants in a variety of roles: infantry shock troops, raiders, sentries, spies, trench diggers, and porters.[18] Regardless of the responsibility, each role has long-term, negative effects on the child.

It's safe to say the participation of children in armed conflict is now global in scope and massive in number. The United Nations reports that one in six children live in areas of the world affected by war or armed conflict. Although child soldiers are often forcefully recruited, it is not the primary way that children become involved in armed conflict. While there is usually an element of "choice" involved, that term is used very loosely and inaccurate considering the agent of consent and dire circumstances. It is far more common that coercion, in partnership with desperate circumstances, plays a role in this choice, as many children are offered initial payments. Factors such as lack of educational and employment opportunities, living in areas of armed conflict or refugee camps, and poverty highly influence these childrens' circumstances.[19]

B. **History Of The Topic**

The issue of child soldiers stands with a long historical pedigree that has carried over into the modern era and continued to haunt the MENA region today. Documented back to the classical world and prevalent till the 19th century, the phenomenon was thought to be slowly disappearing as the modern nation state came into being. Yet, the issue only worsened and intensified as conflict broke out. The UN Office for Children and Armed Conflict found that the number of children

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[16] Druba, Volker. "The Problem of Child Soldiers." *International Review of Education*, 1 July 2002, link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1020309527289?error=cookies_not_supported&code=f6755cd4-9773-4fa0-862f-2 fc24d9e82f8.
[17] McLure, Jason. "Global Journalist: The Problem of Child Soldiers." *KBIA*, 29 Nov. 2018, www.kbia.org/post/global-journalist-problem-child-soldiers.
[18] Plett, Michelle. "Plight of the Child Soldier: Facts, Foundations and How to Help." *Worldvision*, 4 Aug. 2020, www.worldvision.ca/stories/child-soldiers-facts-and-how-to-help.

[19] Ibid.

either forcibly or voluntarily fighting in the various conflicts in the MENA region doubled in number in 2019.[20] Typically, recruiting parties are given conscription targets that change according to the group's needs and objectives. For example, the Union of Congolese Patriots for Reconciliation and Peace (UPC/RP), a militia led by Thomas Lubanga in eastern Congo, instituted a policy where each family within its area of control must provide the militia with money, a cow, or child. Although the militia technically gives families a choice on what to offer, the groups sent to collect children are strategically more efficient. For example, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda sends raiding parties into villages to meet their numerical goals of children recruited.

Specifically, the rising numbers of child soldiers skyrocketed in all Middle Eastern countries embroiled in intense conflict with no peace in sight, such as Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen.[21] In al-Buqa, Yemen, a small city near the Saudi Arabian border that has witnessed frequent combative conflict between Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition, Yemeni children are being recruited as soldiers and trained to fight. In 2018, Al-Jazeera reported that despite the fact that Yemen and Saudi Arabia both signed the international protocol banning involvement of children in armed conflict in 2007 and 2011, Saudi Arabia was accused of recruiting Sudanese children from Darfur to fight on its behalf in Yemen and trafficking children from Yemen to defend the Saudi border.[22]

In Iraq, the first account of Iraqi child soldiers was documented in Iran in 1984 when Iranian President Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani declared that "all Iranians from 12 to 72 should volunteer for the Holy War." in an effort to combat Iraq under Saddam Hussein's power. Saddam discovered Iran's plan to enroll children and ran with it. Under his power, Iraq, in turn, enrolled child soldiers in conflict and developed an entire apparatus designed to pull children into conflict.[23] This included the infamous Fedayeen or Ashbaal Saddam (Saddam's Lion Cubs), a paramilitary force of boys between the ages of 10 and 15 that was formed after the first Gulf War and received training in small arms and light infantry tactics. More than 8,000 young Iraqis were members of this group in Baghdad alone.[24]

Sudan, to this day, has seen the largest use of child soldiers in the region, with approximately 100,000 children who have served on both sides (North and South Sudan before secession) of the two decades-old civil war.[25] Since 1995, the Islamic government in the north has conscripted boys

[20] "Begin with the Children: Child Soldier Numbers Doubled in the Middle East in 2019." Middle East Institute, 2020, www.mei.edu/publications/begin-children-child-soldier-numbers-doubled-middle-east-2019.

[21] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Refworld | Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - Iraq." Refworld, 2019, www.refworld.org/docid/498805f0c.html.

[22] Al Jazeera. "Exclusive: Yemeni Child Soldiers Recruited by Saudi-UAE Coalition." Saudi Arabia News | Al Jazeera, 1 Apr. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2019/03/exclusive-yemeni-child-soldiers-recruited-saudi-uae-coalition-190329132329547.html.

[23] "Lambs into Lions: The Utilization of Child Soldiers in the War in Iraq and Why International and Iraqi Laws are Failing to Protect the Innocent" Anna-Liisa, Jacobsen. *Richmond Journal of Glow Law and Business ,*2008. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=global

[24] Singer, Peter. "Facing Saddam's Child Soldiers." Brookings, 28 July 2016, www.brookings.edu/research/facing-saddams-child-soldiers.

[25] "Refworld | Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 - Sudan." *Refworld*, 2014, www.refworld.org/docid/4988062928.html.

as young as 12 into the army and the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces (PDF). Homeless, poor, and refugee children are specifically targeted and trafficked to closed camps. It is also recorded that orphanages are often used as training camps.[26] One report found that 22 percent of the total primary school population in Wahda province had been recruited into the Sudanese army or pro government militias, the youngest being 9 years old.[27] The government has also targeted children in towns located in South Sudan to manipulate against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), illustrating that oftentimes, the trafficking of child soldiers is politically incentivized.[28]

C. Finding A Solution To The Problem: Past, Present, and Future

The issue of child soldiers has proven to be one of the most difficult circumstances to tackle, as many outside factors contribute to its presence. So, it is important to be well read on your country's internal stability and all pressing issues relevant to your country in order to fully tackle this topic. When trying to end the scourge of child soldiers, it is necessary to work not only with armed groups, but to consider other means by which the cycle can end. Addressing the root cause of the child soldier problem means tackling the numerous factors that impact recruitment, such as rates of poverty, access to education, civil war, and regional leadership/dynamics of power.

Moreover, research and develop systems of punishment and deterrence. Such measures include the use of sanctions against child soldier leaders, supporters, enablers, and the wider application of war crimes tribunals and labor laws. These steps may not fully deter the use of child soldiers, but will at least take away some of its advantages and, most importantly, connect the practice of recruiting and using child soldiers with some form of realistic penalty. To remain within the scope of the JDC, also challenge yourself to explore and integrate your country's military frameworks into this topic, and see how the committee can adopt (or expand on) such language, either creating or amending state-level military protocols to limit the use of child soldiers.

Lastly, former child soldiers must be treated as nothing less than victims and full, unconditional support must be given to them. Child soldiers require sustained and systematic efforts to allow them to redevelop a different life-styles and gain opportunities that were stolen from them. Demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration are hardly discussed in regard to child soldiers since it is quite difficult to adopt League-wide, so make sure to include this possibility in your research. They require sustained and systematic support to allow them to regain the childhood and opportunities that were stolen from them.

II. Questions to Consider in your Research

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[26] UN Economic and Social Council. Country programme document: South Sudan. April 18, 2016: E/ICEF/2016/P/L.9. https://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/2016-15-Compendium-ODS-EN.pdf

[27] Mednick, Sam. "In South Sudan, a new approach in ending child soldiers' use." *AP New*s. November 25, 2018. https://apnews.com/b6834d06e6c7441c894db49af89264d8#:~:text=peacekeeping%20mission%20during%20the%20Rwandan,children%20as%20weapons%20of%20war.

[28] Human Rights Watch. "We Can Die Too: Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in South Sudan." *Human Rights Watch,* December 14, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/14/we-can-die-too/recruitmentand-use-child-soldiers-south-sudan.

- Are child soldiers a prevalent issue in my represented member state? If yes, has my represented member state made efforts to prevent this issue? Were they successful?

- Is my represented member state affiliated with any NGOs or UN organizations that work on minimizing this issue?

- What factors contribute to the escalation of child soldiers? Is gender one of them?

III. Questions a Resolution Might Answer

- How will the league address member states who deny the issue of child soldiers in their borders?

- How will member states prevent and handle refugee children being recruited as child soldiers?

- How will ideological/ interest divides be addressed in the force? How will the League ensure that smaller states who have less influence and less to contribute are not treated unfairly in regards to the force?

- What language can be drafted for the League to adopt regarding age disputes and consent?

- Will the League carry out preliminary, extensive research on the previous attempts to improve Arab militaries? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

IV. Additional Resources

- [Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950](Arab League treaty that initiated the JDC)

- [Arab Charter on Human Rights](Arab League framework that will provide you with background information and examples of committee language)

- [Aljazeera Middle East News](Great resource to stay up to date on your country)

Topic III: Exploring avenues to promote military diplomacy between Member States, including joint training exercises, collaboration on research and development, and other forms of capacity-building towards readiness and unity.

I. **Introduction To The Topic**

A. **General Background**

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and post the colonial era, the MENA region has faced some of history's greatest military predicaments. The 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation (JDECT), which, in parallel with the name of the treaty, established both the Joint Defense Council and the Economic Council, has acted as the foundation of military cooperation for the League of Arab States.[29] This document, drafted and originally signed by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen, laid down the framework for regional cooperation to ensure the political stability, security, and strength of each contracting member on its individual capabilities as well as the League in a united capacity.[30] Within this framework, Article II, Article IV, and the military annex elucidate the need and intent for a joint Arab military force. Yet, the JDECT has illustrated the failures and faulted trends that prevent military effectiveness.

Military effectiveness refers to the ability of soldiers and officers to perform on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to execute the strategies devised by their political military leaders.[31] Combat veteran S.L.A Marshall has argued that "an army's tactical foundation is probably the single most important element of its overall effectiveness" and with the abandonment of the JDECT, the Arab world has been navigating blindly in an attempt to overcome their internal military failures.[32] Arab militaries have been unable to achieve such effectiveness for four prominent reasons; unit cohesions, generalship, information management, and weapons handling. It is key to look for these four targets as you research your member state's stance regarding this topic.

B. **History of The Topic**

Since 1945, the Arab world has found itself in an almost continuous losing streak and failures throughout military advances. These setbacks are not random though, and a clear trend is distinct: lack of cooperation. In almost every instance, Arabs have had initial leverage, whether it's weaponry or skill, yet found themselves at a loss in the end. The greatest example that cost the Arab world Palestinian freedom is the 1967 Six Day War. With Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian units combined it was an estimated four Arab soldiers for every (one) Israeli soldier. A four to one

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[29] "The Avalon Project : Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950." Yale, avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp

[30] Ibid.

[31] "Understanding Modern Military Effectiveness," *Arabs at War*. Pollack, Kennneth M. *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ArabsatWar_Intro.pdf

[32] "SLA Marshall's 'Men Against Fire' - Has Dave Grossman Gotten This All Wrong?" Sla, www.theppsc.org/Grossman/SLA_Marshall/Main.htm.

ratio, yet the Arabs were easily defeated. Poor unit cohesion and constant internal disputes gave the Israelis great leverage despite their quantitative insecurity.[33]

Another example is Libya's conquests in northern Chad in 1987. Libyan forces deployed far more advanced and more powerful weaponry than their Chadian opponents but were defeated nonetheless. The Libyans were armed advanced with Soviet-made weapons, such as T-62 and T-55 tanks, D-30 and M-46 artillery pieces, and MiG-21, MiG-23, and Su-22 fighter-bombers, while the Chadian forces possessed outdated, insufficient equipment and no vehicle transportation. The Chadians had no tanks, no armored personnel carriers (APCs), no combat artillery, no air force, and no infantry weapons. It is also reported that the Chadians did not operate their weaponry very well. Nevertheless, an army of as many as 20,000 Libyans was demolished by 10,000 Chadian regulars and 20,000 tribal militia during eight months of fighting.[34]

C. Finding A Solution To The Problem: Past, Present, and Future

Today, the League of Arab States is in need of two provisions. First, it is necessary to develop plans for the standardization of military equipment across the Arab world for use in training and interventions. This would encourage Arab states to begin producing domestic weapons platforms and prioritizes interoperability through the development of Arab weapons and weapons systems. At times of collective security, it would be greatly difficult to conduct information sharing or come to a country's defense without at least a portion of shared weaponry. As delegates, it is your role to operationalize this with specific details on the types of standards and weapon-sharing needed.

Second, is information/training sharing. Going back to the JDECT, we notice although a joint Arab force never fully materialized, the standard-setting, joint training, and potential frameworks were all developed and processed. Many member states, today, have adopted these frameworks or continued to build off of them. Researching your country's military frameworks will provide you with this understanding and lay out the JDECT military intersection. Joint training missions and capacity building operations are a necessary precursor to future military harmonization; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization uses such tactics when working with states that may potentially join the organization in the future.

Undeniably, information sharing will stand as your biggest hurdle in this topic, as not all member states would support this solution since information security is often difficult to ensure. It is your responsibility to develop methods for Arab militaries, compartmentalize information, and ensure that little to no information flows from top levels down to field formations, and that lower levels of the chain of command don't regularly distort or even fabricate information to exaggerate successes and hide failures.

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[33]Al Jazeera. "The War in June 1967." Israel | Al Jazeera, 2 June 2017, www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2017/05/war-june-1967-170529070920911.html.
[34]"Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence." Crisis Group, 12 Aug. 2016, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/libyachad-beyond-political-influence.

II. Questions to Consider in Your Research

● What are the implications, positive or negative, of a joint Arab force on my country?

● What are the implications, positive or negative, of a joint Arab force on the League as a whole? Given the current circumstances of the region, is a joint Arab force even possible?

● Has my country ever engaged in a joint force endeavor with other member states? With other states besides those in the League? What made those endeavors successful or problematic?

● What makes the joint forces of similar international organizations successful?

● What remedies can be applied to the previous failed attempts at a joint Arab force?

III. Questions a Resolution Might Answer

● Will the League carry out preliminary, extensive research on the previous attempts to improve Arab militaries? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

● Will all states be required to share information or joint training?

● How will contributions be determined?

● How will ideological/ interest divides be addressed in the force? How will the League ensure that smaller states who have less influence and less to contribute are not treated unfairly in regards to the force?

● Will member states exchange information regarding military training? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

● Will the League conduct joint training exercises? How else will training be conducted?

● How will the League ensure that there is seamless fusion and unity between soldiers and military personnel in light of cultural differences, different societal norms, and/or different backgrounds?

IV. Additional Resources

● Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950 (Arab League treaty that initiated the JDC)

● NATO Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, Netherlands (Resource on military diplomacy outside of the MENA region)

● Gulf Cooperation Council Establishes Unprecedented Joint Military Command (Resource on military diplomacy in the Gulf)

Topic IV: Promoting cooperation among Member States in expanding military-level resilience to hybrid warfare threats and tactics.

I.   **Introduction to the Topic**

   A. General Background

Hybrid warfare threats and tactics are increasingly common and dangerous in the realm of modern global security. Before discussing the nature of the problem, however, one of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about hybrid challenges is the problem of language. Terms such as "hybrid," "threats," and "warfare" are interchangeably and incorrectly used/paired without consideration for circumstances, while concepts such as "gray zone warfare," "competition short of war," and "modern political warfare" are—while helpful in their own right—too often conflated in policy publications and academic literature.[35] So, before we can fully dive into the intricacies and details of hybrid warfare, we must clarify and distinguish between two key terms: hybrid warfare and hybrid threats.

Hybrid Warfare (HW) is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, cyber warfare and subversion, and blurs the formal distinction between war and peace.[36] It is often characterised by the use of deceptive propaganda, deniable forces, espionage, the mobilisation of ethnic, linguistic or confessional minorities, and arguably terrorism.[37] The difficulty of targeting and fully understanding hybrid warfare is distinguishing the difference between normal legal activities, coercive diplomacy and war makes the theory of hybrid warfare. This is why hybrid warfare is often referred to as an 'anticipatory' strategy.[38]

 A hybrid threat, however, is the use of multiple, ambiguous means to target vulnerabilities across society to achieve goals gradually without triggering decisive responses.[39] Since hybrid warfare extends beyond the traditional military domain, we must re-examine how we address non-state aggressors and state aggression, as well as security and defence challenges. Although the difference between these terms may seem minimal and purely semantic, in warfare circumstances, they can greatly affect how states react and utilize state hybrid warfare.

   B. History of the Topic

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[35]National Defense University, PRISM. "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges." PRISM | National Defense University, 8 Nov. 2018, cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1680696/examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges
[36] "Global Strategies: Hybrid Warfare in the Middle East." *London School of Economics*, 2017, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Hybrid-Warfare-in-the-Middle-East.pdf
[37]"Russian Strategy Expansion, Crisis and Conflict." Taylor & Francis, 2020, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121.
[38] "What is Hybrid Warfare?" Reichborn-Kjennerud, Erik and Patrick Cullen. *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2016, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07978?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
[39] "Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for a Future Joint Force?" Monaghan, Sean. *NDU PRESS*, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Monaghan.pdf?ver=2019-09-17-231051-890

In the MENA region, we find non-state and state hybrid warfare tactics utilized in different manners. Various characteristics that have been attributed to hybrid warfare are conducted by non-state actors. These actors exhibit increased levels of military sophistication as they move up the ladder by deploying modern weapons systems and technologies, such as cyber terrorism.[40] For example, non-state hybrid warfare in battlefields in Lebanon and Iraq, where we find direct communication and conflict between civilians, state representors, and non-state aggressors.[41] This tactical use in modern warfare has given non-state aggressors in Lebanon and Iraq validity and credibility, as they greatly shape the country's stability and future.

State hybrid warfare, however, functions in a much more direct and arguably legal manner. For example, Saudi Arabia's military and political interventions in Yemen, acting as the unofficial state representative against the Houthi rebels. In this situation, a foreign state aggressor is involved in conflict with a non-state aggressor, both using hybrid warfare tactics to fulfill different agendas.[42] We also find common methods of hybrid warfare used in the MENA region, such as asymmetric threats. Recent attacks against oil tankers near the United Arab Emirates and airborne drone strikes against Saudi Arabian oil pumping stations, for example, act as an asymmetric threat.[43]

C. Finding A Solution To The Problem: Past, Present, and Future

The main solution regarding hybrid warfare is defense, and the role of defense in detecting hybrid threats will not be substantively different from existing practice. Two principles should apply: closer cooperation across government and closer cooperation with allies and partners. Beyond this, defense's contribution to detecting hybrid threats will remain focused on exploiting strategic intelligence and data from technical and physical assets deployed around the world. You may want to consider creating steering committees or an outside body that can research and analyze such data and cooperation. Think of analysis as dots that connect across unfamiliar domains of hybrid warfare.[44]

Analysis, however, must consider political, economic, social, and military context when processing data, so make sure not to detach outside bodies' efforts from the league's overarching goals. This may require enhanced training and will certainly require more familiarity, contact, and closer working with diplomats and Information Technology (IT) sectors from across governments, other nations, and multinational institutions. Private-public collaboration is a common point of

[40] "Cybersecurity Challenges in the Middle East"Abul-Enein, Sameh. *Geneva Center for Security Policy,* 2017. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/GCSP-Cybersecurity%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf

[41] "Lessons from Lebanon: Hezbollah and Hybrid Warfare." Hoffman, Frank G. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 2006. https://www.fpri.org/article/2006/08/lessons-from-lebanon-hezbollah-and-hybrid-wars/

[42] "Hybrid Warfare Matures in the Gulf." Heller, Christian, 2019, *THE ARAB GULF STATES INSTITUTION IN WASHINGTON* https://agsiw.org/hybrid-warfare-matures-in-the-gulf/

[43] Kalin, Stephen. "Saudi Arabia Accuses Iran of Ordering Drone Attack on Oil Pipeline." U.S., 16 May 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran/saudi-arabia-accuses-iran-of-ordering-drone-attack-on-oil-pipeline-idUSKCN1SM0WJ.

[44] "Superpower Hybrid Warfare in Syria." Celso, Anthony N. *USMCU,* 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1068694.pdf

contention in committee, as it is typically deemed unreliable and lacking trust. So, when expanding on private sector and public sector relations, make sure to draft incentives for multinational companies or other resources to ensure cooperation.

Finally, member states must develop a framework to effectively respond to hybrid warfare. It's important to note that defense must continue to provide the government with conventional defensive and offensive options as part of a whole-of-government response to counter hybrid threats, while taking into account non-state aggressors and their influence in the region. Defense is also required to provide options besides war or combative conflict to influence (deter, deny, disrupt, coerce) a predictably hostile state actor. Keep in mind, in most cases, defense will not be the lead response to hybrid threats, so make sure not to rely too heavily on this solution, rather use it as a framework and develop it to present to the committee.

II. Questions to Consider in Your Research

- What are the implications, positive or negative, of hybrid warfare?

- Has your represented member state used hybrid warfare? Been subjected to it?

- How does your member state define a "proxy" group? Does this definition align with terrorism? If yes, has your member state made efforts to combat this issue?

- Are there examples of cyber warfare or propaganda outlets being used as mediums to integrate hybrid warfare in your represented member state?

III. Questions a Resolution Might Answer

- Will the League carry out preliminary, extensive research on non-state aggressors who use hybrid warfare? Will this require a body such as a committee to accomplish?

- How will member states develop potentially substantive revisions to both defense's contribution to homeland resilience and the resilience of defense itself to hybrid threats?

- How will the League hold member states that use hybrid warfare accountable? Is hybrid warfare ethical when used in defensive circumstances?

- How will improved coordination between the use of force and the other levers of power across government help prevent hybrid warfare?
- How can member states develop potentially substantive revisions to the way defense is organized, resourced, and equipped to offer the government more options that fall below the threshold of armed conflict?

IV. Additional Resources

- [LSE Ideas Hybride Warfare](#) (Background information on Hybrid Warfare in the MENA region)

- [Countering Hybrid Warfare](#) (Resource for developing solutions)

- [Hybrid Warfare Use in Gulf Region](#) (Details upcoming cyber Hybrid Warfare in the Gulf)