2025-2026
Model Arab League
BACKGROUND GUIDE

Crisis Committee

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National Council on US-Arab Relations

Original draft by Olivia Woodard, Crisis Coordinator of the Crisis Committee at the Northeast Model Arab League 2025, with contributions from the dedicated staff and volunteers at Northeastern University and the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations

Honorable Delegates,

Welcome to the 2025-2026 Northeast Model Arab League Crisis Committee! My name is Olivia Woodard, and I am currently a student at Northeastern University, majoring in International Affairs and International Business with a minor in Political Science. This will be my second time staffing NERMAL, and I could not be more excited to be this year's Crisis Director. While MAL conferences do not typically include a crisis committee, NERMAL allows delegates to engage in fast-paced and innovative decision-making by responding to interactive updates from our crisis team in a collaborative setting. Though the tasks of a crisis committee may seem daunting, I can assure you that we are here to assist with any questions you may have relating to procedure or content, both prior to and during the conference. Crisis committees serve as a great opportunity to improve upon one's speaking, policy, and creativity skills, and we cannot wait to watch our delegates' growth and progress.

The Arab Spring was a turning point for the Arab League, a moment in time where life as many knew it was changed completely. As representatives from your respective countries, we hope to see delegates respond to crises innovatively and shape history. This committee is set to take place just as the Arab Spring begins, meaning that delegates may influence any course of events as they see fit. I look forward to seeing your ideas and crisis arcs come to life!

Sincerely,
Olivia Woodard, Crisis Director

Dear Esteemed Delegates,

Welcome to the 2025-2026 Northeast Model Arab League Crisis Committee! My name is Sreya Ravi, and I am currently a senior at Northeastern University, majoring in Health Sciences and Business Administration with a Music minor, and serving as President of Northeastern University's International Relations Council. I have three years of Model Arab League experience and 8 years of Model Debate experience. This will be my second time staffing NERMAL, and I could not be more excited to be this year's Crisis Chair for the second year in a row! NERMAL's crisis committee is a wonderful opportunity for delegates to exercise creative thinking and respond to changes within an evolving debate landscape in real time. As Chair, I am more than happy to answer any questions you may have pertaining to the crisis or debate as a whole alongside the crisis team. The Arab Spring is a pivotal point in Arab League history, and one that has had lasting effects on the present-day Middle East region's geopolitical climate. It is a truly unique opportunity to be able to simulate this debate, exercise bold strategies, and craft outcomes that could change the future of the Arab League. I am looking forward to meeting you all and to a weekend of fruitful debate in the beautiful city of Boston!

Sincerely,
Sreya Ravi, Chair

Committee Agenda: ***The Arab Spring: Revolution!***

I. Committee Mission

The Council of the League of Arab States is the Arab League's principal decision-making body, composed of the foreign ministers of all member states and, at times, heads of state or permanent representatives. It has the authority to debate urgent regional issues, adopt resolutions that guide collective action, and coordinate joint diplomatic, economic, and security policies. While the Council traditionally meets in ordinary sessions twice a year, it may also be convened for extraordinary or emergency sessions at the request of member states.

For the purposes of this simulation, on **December 30, 2010**, the Council gathered in Cairo for an emergency session. Ministers have been called together amid growing concerns over economic instability, high unemployment, and visible public dissatisfaction across the region. In Tunisia, riots have already broken out, and the Arab League is aware that mounting unrest could threaten the stability of other governments and the League as a whole. This background guide serves as a backdrop to the events leading up to the Arab Spring. While the Arab Spring officially began on December 17, 2010, a multitude of factors led to the mass unrest and protests that emerged after this date. The information in this background guide is meant to deepen your understanding of the Arab Spring and its timeline, but is in no means the guidelines by which crisis situations may unfold. For instance, while this background guide mentions that Egypt's President resigned and handed control to the military on February 11, 2011, this event may or may not play out in the simulation as a crisis update. Crisis updates will be driven by the delegates' and committee's directives, rather than the actual timeline of events of the Arab Spring. This background guide is meant to inform delegates of their country's potential policies and help shape their own objectives in committee. The date will be announced during each crisis update, meaning that by the conclusion of the committee, the last update could take place as far in history as delegates have driven the crises to go (i.e. December 15, 2012, two years from the committee's start date).

II. Historical Context and Causes of the Arab Spring

Various factors led to the Arab Spring. Issues including high youth unemployment, rising social inequalities, government corruption, and declining economies due to the global financial crisis and food price increases ultimately caused the monumental uprisings in the MENA region.[1] A major cause of civil unrest during the 2010s was a population boom that resulted in an influx of young, working-age people, which did not match the growth in regional labor demand. Between 1975 and 2005, the population in Arab countries more than doubled, reaching 314 million, according to the UN Development Program. Half of this population was under the age of thirty, though in certain MENA states, the percentage of people under thirty was even higher. This placed enormous pressure on the economic systems in each state, as there were a number of young people in search of jobs as well as children who required access to education, healthcare, and other social support programs. Of the total population of working-age adults in the MENA region, there were generally two groups of young people seeking employment: those seeking entry-level jobs, and those with post-secondary education seeking higher-level positions. Moreover, with populations that skewed younger, many states did not experience high levels of turnover or attrition - in other words, older workers did not leave their positions or the workforce to open new opportunities to younger generations. This created an untenable employment environment: few entry-level positions despite high demand, fewer opportunities for highly educated young people seeking more substantial income and benefits, and ultimately, high rates of unemployment. Whereas global unemployment levels for young people hovered around twelve percent, youth unemployment in the MENA region was double that at 24 percent - some of the highest in the world according to the International Labour Organization (ILO). This phenomenon was also widespread in the region; higher-income countries, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, struggled in the same ways as lower-income countries, such as Tunisia and Libya, to meet the employment demands of their youth population.

Young people with post-secondary education struggled to find suitable employment, but they were also vocal in sharing their concerns about their governments' inability to address these challenges. Increases in education rates compounded the existing deficiencies in the labor

[1] Muhammed Kürşad Özekin and Hasan Hüseyin Akkaş, "An Empirical Look To The Arab Spring: Causes And Consequences," *Turkish Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1-2 (2014): 76-87.

market, but it also contributed to a shift in perspective for many students: they now also possessed the necessary tools to critically examine the governments meant to serve them, as well as to advocate for fact-supported changes they believed would improve the well-being of citizens in their countries. When governments failed to act or disallowed them from participating in government altogether, they embraced both traditional communication means - interest group interaction, participation in social movements, and the like - as well as social media to shed light on these issues, widely communicate, and explain their discontent to others. [2] The spread of ideas created perfect conditions for widespread protests and unrest. Therefore, addressing the economic crisis and unemployment rates was necessary for decreasing popular discontent, especially among educated young people.

As education rose and citizens became more connected with other regions, they also began to take issue with established governmental processes. The negligence of democratic principles by governments in the MENA region was also a significant contributing factor to the Arab Spring. Most governments, such as Tunisia's, were authoritarian regimes. While they had been in place for decades leading up to 2011, the gradual increase in suppressive tactics, worsening economic conditions, and decrease in government accountability triggered increased discontent and more prominent critiques of the government. Leading up to and during the Arab Spring, the World Bank's Voice and Accountability indicator found that the MENA region substantially lagged behind other developing regions regarding their perception of having a popular voice in government, media freedoms, and governmental accountability. Additionally, out of the seven world regions, the MENA region was the only one that experienced a significant decline in voice and accountability indicators over the last 12 years before the uprisings.[3] This indicator includes measures of the extent to which citizens feel they can participate in government, as well as how prominent they feel their freedoms of speech, press, and other rights are.

The MENA region also remained below the world median in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) each year through 2011, indicating low trust in government and high perceived governmental corruption.[4] Most Arab regimes were classified as highly authoritarian systems,

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[2]UNU-wider : Journal special issue article : Youth unemployment and the arab spring. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250502054454/https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/youth-unemployment-and-arab-spring.
[3]Worldbank. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VA.EST.
[4]2011 - CPI - transparency.org. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2011.

where a small number of individuals hold the majority of the political power. To add to the unrest, many regional leaders had been in power for decades, slowly losing both their credibility and their popular support. For instance, Hosni Mubarak, president of Egypt, gained power in 1981 and retained it through 2011.[5]

Additionally, widespread human rights violations by authoritarian governments also sparked Arab popular uprisings. Fundamental individual liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of organization, had been consistently violated by most Arab regimes, particularly in the realm of press freedom. These regimes allowed little to no ability for their people to voice opinions opposing those of the government.[6] Notably, A long history of protest suppression preceded the Arab Spring throughout the MENA region. Before the Arab Spring, Egypt operated under a state of emergency for 30 years, governed by Emergency Law 162 of 1958. In doing so, Egypt's government could restrict civil liberties, promote censorship, suspend habeas corpus, and expand police and military jurisdiction.[7] For instance, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak gave the country's police and military permission to crack down on perceived threats, including protests, during the Emergency Law, which continued into 2012.[8]

To understand the importance of press freedoms to citizens of member states, it is worth noting that state media plays a vital role in the Arab League and, until 1991, it was the only option for most citizens. In 1991, however, CNN coverage of events in Kuwait and Iraq during the Gulf War was broadcast to the Arab world, showing a remarkably different version of events than the state-sponsored radio and broadcast channels.[9] Post-1991, an explosion of television and radio sources became available to the MENA region, including stations such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and others. These Pan-Arab sources provided a steady stream of media coverage to citizens and became more independent over time, leading to an increase in the variety of ideas

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[5] Primoz Manfreda, "10 Reasons for the Arab Spring," April 29, 2025, https://www.thoughtco.com/the-reasons-for-the-arab-spring-2353041.
[6] : Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.
[7] Kira Allmann, "Revolution and Counter-revolution in Egypt's Emergency State," Oxford Human Rights Hub, March 9, 2018, https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/revolution-and-counter-revolution-in-egypts-emergency-state/.
[8] "Before and After the Arab Spring in Egypt," The Borgen Project, accessed October 1, 2025, https://borgenproject.org/the-arab-spring/.
[9] Deborah Young, "Arab Nets Rely on CNN for Gulf Coverage," Variety, January 28, 1991, https://variety.com/1991/scene/markets-festivals/arab-nets-rely-on-cnn-for-gulf-coverage-99125539/.

that were disseminated to the public.[10] This meant that by the time of the Arab Spring, citizens could more easily recognize propaganda and/or limitations on the freedom of their press, adding to their dissatisfaction. Social media was also a primary organizational tool for the coordination of political protests and the dissemination of ideas. Due to its international reach, it also contributed to the spread of protests across nations. [11] citizens could also compare their situation to others, resulting in a more jaded view towards the hardships they saw resolved elsewhere.

In addition to increasing awareness of current events and politics through a rise in independent and state-sponsored media, people began to compare their own situation to those they were able to learn about. Public opinion surveys conducted during the Arab Spring also indicated rising levels of dissatisfaction with the quality of life in the region.[12] This was evident in value surveys, which showed a rise in dissatisfaction in several areas crucial to the overall quality of life. By the end of the 2000s, the MENA region was the only one in the world to experience significant declines in subjective well-being. More people were dissatisfied with the government services that influenced the quality of life in MENA, including affordable housing, public transportation, quality healthcare, and the availability of quality jobs.[13] While absolute poverty was low and the level of income was moderate during the 2000s, unhappiness due to deteriorating government services, lack of fairness, and widespread corruption grew.[14]

A major quality of life factor lacking in the MENA region was the availability and price of food. More than 50 percent of the food consumed in the MENA region is imported, resulting in essential food items becoming more expensive and thus inaccessible to some. Notably, Egypt is the world's single largest wheat importer. This made the region quite vulnerable to global food price changes, especially in Egypt, where wheat constituted a large portion of a person's diet. [15] In numerous authoritarian regimes, including Egypt, regimes provided food subsidies to ensure stability. However, these efforts were ineffective due to international liberal economic policies.

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[10] 24/7: The rise and influence of Arab media, April 2006, https://stanleycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/24_7.pdf.
[11]https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/facebook-and-twitter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report-1.428773/
[12] Muhammed Kürşad Özekin and Hasan Hüseyin Akkaş, "An Empirical Look To The Arab Spring: Causes And Consequences," *Turkish Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1-2 (2014): 76-87.
[13] World Bank Group, "Middle-class Frustration Fueled the Arab Spring," October 21, 2015, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/21/middle-class-frustration-that-fueled-the-arab-spring.
[14] Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.
[15] Ibid.

In 2008, food and bread prices rose by 19% and 37%, respectively.[16] While this instance may not have been a direct cause of the Arab Spring, both increasing food prices and widespread economic issues fueled the divide between the people of the MENA region and their authoritarian leaders.

A combination of financial issues and corruption also led to the Arab Spring. Since the mid-1980s, large financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, pressured the MENA region into reforming its economies based on an economic liberalization program known as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Because many governments implemented this program, government subsidies of basic essential goods were cancelled, government jobs were cut, and taxation on consumption was increased for citizens, while local and foreign investors received customs and taxation exemptions.[17] Additionally, these policies resulted in the privatization of state industries without transparency measures and the deregulation of labor.[18] This also contributed to high food prices and high unemployment rates. In contrast, many of the ruling elite became wealthier through extensive corrupt practices. For example, the World Bank estimated that at the end of his rule in 2011, Tunisia's President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's wealth represented more than a quarter of Tunisia's gross domestic product.[19] Between 2000 and 2008, more than $9 billion was lost due to illicit financial activities and official government corruption in Tunisia.[20] Therefore, the SAP resulted in a greater divide between ruling elites and ordinary citizens, contributing to the motivations behind the Arab Spring.[21]

Until 2014, 22 members of the Arab League—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain—underwent full-scale uprisings that led to the removal of dictatorial powers, as well as severe unrest. Collectively, these uprisings were referred to as the Arab Spring by Western

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[16] Massoud, Tansa George, et al. "Protests and the Arab Spring: An Empirical Investigation." *Polity*, vol. 51, no. 3, July 2019, pp. 429–465, https://doi.org/10.1086/704001.
[17] : Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.
[18] Adam Hanieh, "Authoritarianism, economic liberalization, and the roots of the 2011 uprisings," Transnational Institute, October 27, 2021, https://www.tni.org/en/article/authoritarianism-economic-liberalization-and-the-roots-of-the-2011-uprisings.
[19] Civil Forum for Asset Recovery, "The Tunisian Job: How to recover 13 billion dollars stolen by the Ben Ali family," August 11, 2016, https://cifar.eu/tunisian-job-recover-13-billion-dollars-stolen-ben-ali-family/.
[20] Francesca Ebel, "The Tunisia Heist," New Lines Magazine, May 7, 2021, https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-tunisia-heist/.
[21] : Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.

media. While the unrest was sparked first and foremost by young people dissatisfied with their situation, a variety of factors contributed to their feelings towards the extant governmental regimes. An increase in underemployed young people who were educated to a higher level allowed citizens to notice the underlying flaws in their society and begin to rebel against them. They became dissatisfied with the economic growth rates, the tightening of authoritarian controls, and the lack of impact on their governments. As tensions increased and governments were unable to resolve or ignored their concerns, citizens resorted to more noticeable forms of protest, eventually triggering the revolutions collectively known as the Arab Spring.

III. Events of the Arab Spring & The Crisis Committee

The Arab Spring was caused by a multitude of factors but began in mid-December of 2010 in Tunisia.[22] On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a jobless graduate who sold vegetables without a permit, set himself on fire to protest against police harassment after police seized his cart.[23] While Bouazizi passed away, his action sparked the beginning of the Arab Spring. On December 29, 2010, Tunisian President Ben Ali declared that the government would work towards job creation but would also be firm on the protestors. On January 9, 2011, 11 people died due to clashes with security forces.[24] Protests throughout the country were met with violence by law enforcement. However, ten days after Bouazizi's death on January 4, 2011, President Ali was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia due to popular protests by the country's people on January 14, 2011.[25] After 23 years in power, Ali became the first leader of an Arab nation to be forced out of power because of popular protests. The unrest in Tunisia led to revolts across the Arab world against poverty, corruption, and authoritarianism. On October 23, 2011, Tunisians attended their first free election.[26]

Throughout Egypt, thousands of people marched throughout the country's cities and demanded that President Hosni Mubarak be removed from power after 30 years of ruling. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned and handed control to the military. While the Muslim Brotherhood-linked government of Mohammed Morsi was elected in 2012, it was overthrown by the military led by a general turned president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.[27] On February 15, 2011, protestors in Bahrain took over the Pearl Square roundabout and renamed it "Tahrir Square." The protestors demanded numerous reforms, including transitioning to a constitutional monarchy. Days later, however, police stormed the protesters' encampment, killing three people and injuring many others.[28] Also on February 15, 2011, Libyan police broke up a sit-in against the government in Benghazi, Libya. Libya's leader of 42 years, Muammar Gaddafi, declared he was

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[22] "What is the Arab Spring, and how did it start?", Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start.
[23] "The Arab Srping - Chronology," Shoreline, accessed August 3, 2025, https://www.shoreline.edu/gac/documents/great-discussions-2013/arab-spring-timelines.pdf.
[24] Ibid.
[25] "What is the Arab Spring, and how did it start?", Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start.
[26] "What is the Arab Spring, and how did it start?", Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

determined to hunt down the "rats" that had opposed him, contributing to an uprising turned civil war. American, French, British, and NATO air forces ultimately intervened against Gaddafi, who was captured and killed on October 20, 2011, by Libyan rebels. This led the country to be split between rival western and eastern-based administrations.[29]

On March 6, 2011, a dozen teenagers in southern Syria wrote "Your turn, doctor," on their school's wall. This was a reference to Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, who was a trained ophthalmologist. While the unrest initially consisted of peaceful protests and calls for democratic reform, government repression resulted in a civil war.[30] Yemen's people also participated in protests against their government. After a year of unrest and protests, Yemen's leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, gave up his power of 33 years to Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi. In response, violent protests in Yemen continued.[31]

Throughout the region, people used the same techniques of civil resistance—strikes, marches, rallies, and demonstrations. Additionally, social media played a large role in organizing these planned events. Social media was essential for protestors to organize, communicate, raise awareness, and issue danger alerts despite internet censorship and police brutality.[32]

A major slogan of protestors was *Ash-sha'b yurid isqat an-nizam:* "The people want to bring down the regime." The most organized and largest protests occurred on pre-planned "days of rage." These types of demonstrations were most common on Fridays following afternoon prayers.[33]

To address the problems of citizens and prevent further conflict, states should focus on actionable solutions, as well as the extent to which their regimes are open or closed to change and dialogue. Overall, the events of the Arab Spring were nuanced and nationally specific, although the common trends connecting them demonstrate the increased connectivity between nations that was so central to allowing citizens to identify their desired reforms through comparison.

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[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] : Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.
[33] Ibid.

Questions to Consider:

1. What were the major sources of unrest in your country during 2011 and prior?
2. What actions could be taken to prevent further unrest in your country?
3. How can your nation work to resolve complaints from citizens?
4. If a revolution were to occur in your nation, what could be done to mitigate its fallout?
5. Does your character seek to embrace change or stick to the current regime?
6. How might regional unrest affect your home base?

IV. Character Dossiers

These dossiers are meant to provide delegates with an understanding of their stance in committee; however, delegates are expected to conduct their own research on the topic and position in committee.

Kamel Morjane: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tunisia

Loyal to President Ben Ali, Morjane represents a regime under growing public criticism for corruption and unemployment, determined to frame unrest as a purely internal issue.[34]

Ahmed Aboul Gheit: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

A seasoned diplomat and staunch supporter of Hosnia Mubarak, Aboul Gheit is focused on preserving Egypt's leadership in the Arab world and preventing any sign of dissent.[35]

Moussa Koussa: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Libya

A longtime Gaddafi confidant and former intelligence chief, Koussa helped reintegrate Libya into the international community by persuading Gaddafi to abandon nuclear weapons and negotiating Lockerbie bombing settlements, but his inside knowledge of the regime could make him a valuable asset for rebels if he were to defect.[36]

Taieb Fassi Fihri: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Morocco

A trusted advisor to King Mohammed VI, Fihri portrays Morocco as a monarchy committed to careful reform, while working behind the scenes to avoid regional upheaval.[37]

Mourad Medelci: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

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[34] "Tunisian foreign minister Kamel Morjane resigns," The Guardian, January 27, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/27/tunisia-foreign-minister-quits.
[35] "H.E. Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit," Arab Dialogue Circle, accessed August 15, 2025, https://aast.edu/en/conferences/ADC-LAS/aboulghet.html.
[36] "Profile: Moussa Koussa," Al Jazeera, March 31, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/3/31/profile-moussa-koussa.
[37] "Mr Taieb Fassi Fihri," Kingdom of Morocco National Human Rights Council, accessed August 15, 2025, https://archive.cndh.ma/an/advisory-coucil-human-rights-members/mr-taieb-fassi-fihri.

An establishment figure loyal to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Medelci is wary of unrest spreading from neighboring Tunisia and Libya into Algeria, which has its own history of civil conflict and dissent.[38]

Walid Muallem: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syria

Fiercely loyal to Bashar al-Assad, Muallem defends authoritarian rule as necessary for stability and rejects calls for political reform, often blaming unrest on foreign meddling.[39]

Nasser Judeh: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jordan

A moderate and pragmatic diplomat, Judeh looks to balance support for Arab consensus with protecting Jordan's Hashemite monarchy from growing domestic economic frustration.[40]

Ali al-Shami: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lebanon

An ally of Hezbollah and closely tied to Syria, al-Shami uses his position to highlight Lebanon's fragility and warn that unrest could tip the country back into instability.[41]

Prince Saud al-Faisal: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia

The world's longest-serving foreign minister, Prince Saud, is a conservative power broker determined to protect Saudi interests and prevent revolutionary ideas from entering the Gulf.[42]

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan: Minister of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates

A younger Gulf leader with a modern image, he balances cautious reform rhetoric with a firm stance against instability threatening monarchies.[43]

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[38] "Head of Algeria's Constitutional Council dies at 76," Anadolu Ajansı, January 28, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/head-of-algerias-constitutional-council-dies-at-76/1376742
[39] "Syria's veteran Foreign Minister Walid Muallem dies aged 79," BBC, November 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54959002.
[40] "Mr. Nasser Judeh," UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, United Nations, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/content/mr-nasser-judeh.
[41] "Lebanon's Hariri forms unity government with Hezbollah," Reuters, November 9, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/lebanons-hariri-forms-unity-government-with-hezbollah-idUSTRE5A84B6/.
[42] Bruce Riedel, "Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi who was Washington's wisest ally," Brookings, Kuly 20, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/prince-saud-al-faisal-the-saudi-who-was-washingtons-wisest-ally/.
[43] "Minister of Foreign Affairs," United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/the-ministry/the-ministers/minister-of-foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation.

Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

Facing simmering protests at home, he defends his monarchy's legitimacy and seeks regional backing against opposition groups calling for reform.[44]

Yusuf bin Alawai bin Abdullah: Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Oman

Known as a quiet mediator, he often plays a balancing role in the MENA region, stressing dialogue while worrying about economic unrest in the area.[45]

Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani: Prime Minister & Foreign Minister, Qatar

A powerful figure in regional diplomacy, Hamad bin Jassim leverages Qatar's media (Al Jazeera) and financial clout to position Doha as a mediator and rising power in Arab affairs and beyond.[46]

Abu Bakr al-Qirbi: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen

Loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh, al-Qirbi argues that Yemen's stability is fragile but rejects international pressure for reforms, despite mounting unrest at home.[47]

Ali Karti: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Appointed in June 2010, Karti defends Sudan from international criticism and fears that uprisings elsewhere could embolden Sudanese opposition movements.[48]

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[44] "H.E Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain," European Parliament, August 15, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/201/201206/20120619_cvalkhalifa_en.pdf.

[45] "Thank you, Yusuf bin Alawi: After 23 years, Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs steps down," The Arabian Stories, August 18, 2020, https://www.thearabianstories.com/2020/08/18/thank-you-yusuf-bin-alawi-after-23-years-omans-minister-responsible-for-foreign-affairs-steps-down/.

[46] Sam Bollier, "Can Qatar replace its renaissance man?", Al Jazeera, June 26, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/6/26/can-qatar-replace-its-renaissance-man.

[47] Farouk Luqman, "A physician who became Yemen's foreign minister," Arab News, June 21, 2013, https://www.arabnews.com/news/455679.

[48] "Treasury Designates Entities and Individual Exacerbating Sudan's Instability," U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 28, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1769.